A Postdecisional Neural Marker of Confidence Predicts Information-Seeking in Decision-Making by Desender, K et al.
Behavioral/Cognitive
A Postdecisional Neural Marker of Confidence Predicts
Information-Seeking in Decision-Making
XKobe Desender,1,2 XPeter Murphy,1 XAnnika Boldt,3 XTomVerguts,2 and XNick Yeung4
1Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg-Eppendorf 20251, Germany,
2Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent 9000, Belgium, 3Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London
WC1N 3AZ, United Kingdom, and 4Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6HG, United Kingdom
Theoretical work predicts that decisions made with low confidence should lead to increased information-seeking. This is an adaptive
strategy because it can increase the quality of a decision, and previous behavioral work has shown that decision-makers engage in such
confidence-driven information-seeking. The present study aimed to characterize the neural markers that mediate the relationship
between confidence and information-seeking. A paradigmwas used in which 17 human participants (9male) made an initial perceptual
decision, and then decided whether or not they wanted to sample more evidence before committing to a final decision and confidence
judgment. Predecisional and postdecisional event-related potential componentswere similarlymodulated by the level of confidence and
by information-seeking choices. Time-resolved multivariate decoding of scalp EEG signals first revealed that both information-seeking
choices and decision confidence could be decoded from the time of the initial decision to the time of the subsequent information-seeking
choice (within-conditiondecoding).No above-chancedecodingwas visible in thepreresponse timewindow.Crucially, a classifier trained
to decode high versus low confidence predicted information-seeking choices after the initial perceptual decision (across-condition
decoding). This timewindowcorresponds to that of apostdecisional neuralmarker of confidence. Collectively, our findingsdemonstrate,
for the first time, that neural indices of confidence are functionally involved in information-seeking decisions.
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Introduction
Humans seek information adaptively to improve the quality of
their decisions, for example, by requesting expert advice when
they lack the relevant domain knowledge or discriminating evi-
dence (for review, see Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006). This tendency
has been documented for everyday financial (Hung and Yoong,
2010) and medical (Butler et al., 2009) decisions, as well as in
more carefully controlled laboratory settings (Sniezek and Van
Swol, 2001). Recent evidence suggests that information-seeking
depends crucially on explicit representation of decision confi-
dence (Desender et al., 2018). Theoretically, decision confidence
has been treated as an internal evaluation signal that can be used
to adapt behavior in the absence of external feedback (Yeung and
Summerfield, 2012; Meyniel et al., 2015). When confidence in a
decision is low, this implies that the probability of a decision being
correct is also low, and seeking additional information before com-
mitting to a decision might be particularly beneficial. In a previous
behavioral study, participants engagedmore in information-seeking
in conditions associated with low compared with high confidence,
despite equal accuracy in both (Desender et al., 2018).
At present, however, it remains unclear how the neural coding
of confidence informs the decision to engage in additional
information-seeking. It has been argued that decision confidence
reflects the strength of the evidence in favor of a decision (Vick-
ers, 1979; Zylberberg et al., 2012), stressing the importance of
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Significance Statement
Despite substantial current interest in neural signatures of our sense of confidence, it remains largely unknownhow confidence is
used to regulate behavior. Here, we devised a task in which human participants could decide whether or not to sample additional
decision-relevant information at a small monetary cost. Using neural recordings, we could predict such information-seeking
choices based on a neural signature of decision confidence. Our study illuminates a neural link between decision confidence and
adaptive behavioral control.
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predecisional evidence in the computation of confidence (Kiani
and Shadlen, 2009).On such a view, neural signals involved in the
decision process itself should be predictive of information-
seeking (e.g., the P3 component of the scalp-recorded EEG)
(O’Connell et al., 2012; Twomey et al., 2015). Alternatively, de-
cision confidence has been quantified as a function of continued
evidence accumulation following a decision (Pleskac and Buse-
meyer, 2010; Moran et al., 2015), stressing the importance of
postdecisional signals in the computation of confidence. Re-
cently, a postdecisional centroparietal positivity was found in
scalp EEG recordings that reflects postdecisional neural evidence
accumulation, informing judgments about the accuracy of the
preceding decision (Murphy et al., 2015). This signal is com-
monly referred to as the error positivity (Pe) (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2001) and has been shown to reflect fine-grained variations in
decision confidence (Boldt and Yeung, 2015).
The current study aimed to identify neural signatures of con-
fidence that are predictive of information-seeking behavior. In
our experimental paradigm, on each trial, participants made an
initial perceptual decision about the mean color of eight visual
elements, and then decided whether or not to sample additional
evidence (at a small cost) before committing to a final decision.
Electrophysiological recordings allowed us to evaluate which
neural signatures of confidence were related to information-
seeking choices. To do so, we relied on time-resolved decoding of
EEG data to test for shared neural coding of confidence and de-
cisions to seek additional information. Specifically, we tested
whether a multivariate classifier trained to decode confidence
from EEG data would be predictive of information-seeking
choices. Such between-condition generalization isolates neural
processes integral to translating decision confidence into the
overt decision to sample additional information. Ourmain ques-
tion of interest was whether information-seeking choices could
be predicted based on neural markers of confidence observed
predecisional (P3), postdecisional (Pe), or both.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Seventeen participants (9males, mean SD age: 24.1 3.0 years; range:
21–32 years) took part at Oxford University for monetary compensation
(£20 plus up to £4.92 dependent on performance, range of the rounded
actual payments: £22-£24). The data of 2 participants were excluded
because accuracy of the primary responses was at chance level (48.9%
and 49.6% correct); thus, the final sample comprised 15 participants. All
provided written informed consent, reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and were naive with respect to the hypothesis. All proce-
dures were approved by the local ethics committee.
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a gray background on a 20-inch CRTmonitor
with a 75 Hz refresh rate, using the MATLAB toolbox Psychtoolbox3.
Each stimulus consisted of eight colored shapes spaced regularly around
a fixation point (radius 2.8° visual arc). Tomanipulate task difficulty, the
mean and the variance of the eight elements varied across trials.
Themean color of the eight shapes was determined by the variableC; the
variance across the eight shapes was determined by the variable V. The
mean color of the stimuli varied between red (1, 0, 0) and blue (0, 0, 1)
along a linear path in RGB space (C, 0, 1  C). At the start of the
experiment, C could take four different values: 0.450, 0.474, 0.526, and
0.550 (from blue to red, with 0.5 being the category boundary), and V
could take two different values: 0.0333 and 0.1000 (low and high vari-
ance, respectively). The current task was used because previous research
has shown it can dissociate subjective confidence from objective accu-
racy, by matching the difficulty of two conditions that either have a low
mean (i.e., average color close to the category boundary) or a high vari-
ance (i.e., a varied mix of colors across the eight shapes in the display),
with confidence found to be systematically lower in the latter case (Boldt
et al., 2017a; Desender et al., 2018). On every trial, the color of each
individual element was pseudo-randomly selected with the constraint
that the mean and variance of the eight elements closely matched the
mean of C and its variance V, respectively. Each combination of C and V
values occurred equally often. The individual elements did not vary in
shape. Responses were made using a USB mouse and a standard
QWERTY keyboard.
Procedure
Figure 1 shows an example trial during the main part of the experiment.
After a 200 ms fixation interval, the stimulus was flashed for 200 ms.
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible, deciding
whether the average color of the eight elements was more blue or more
red, by clicking one of two mouse buttons. The mapping between color
and response was counterbalanced between participants. After a 200 ms
postresponse interval, there was a choice phase consisting of two condi-
Figure 1. Timeline of an experimental trial. A stimulus was presented for 200 ms, and participants made a speeded response with the mouse, deciding whether the average color of the eight
elementswas red or blue. On free-choice trials (75%), participants subsequently used a vertical slider to choose either to see the stimulus again in an easier version (bymoving the gray cursor toward
S) or to give their response (by moving the gray cursor toward R). When the stimulus is shown again, the mean of the eight elements is more clearly red and the variance is smaller (note that the
displayed change is exaggerated for illustrationpurposes). Onno-choice trials (25%), participants couldonly choose togive their response. Finally, onall trials, participants jointly indicated their final
response and level of confidence on a horizontal continuous response scale. Being accurate was rewarded (5 points), errors were punished (5 points), and there was a small cost associated with
sampling more information (1 point).
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tions: free-choice or no-choice. On free-choice trials (75% of trials), the
letters R and S appeared, indicating that participants could either choose
to request additional evidence by seeing the stimulus again in an easier
version (S) or to give their response (R). They indicated their choice by
moving a gray slider up or down with their mouse toward their choice,
and confirmed by pressing the space bar (locations of R and S were fixed
across trials and counterbalanced across participants). On no-choice tri-
als (25% of the trials), only an R appeared, and participants were forced
to select the option to give their response.
When participants chose to see the stimulus again, the values of the
stimulus were slightly altered so that the distance to the boundary was
higher (C  C  0.01) and the variability lower (V  V 0.0167),
making the discrimination easier. They were presented with a fixation
point for 400 ms, this easier stimulus for 200 ms, and a fixation point for
400 ms. When participants opted (or were forced) to give their response
without seeing the stimulus again, they simply viewed the fixation point
for the same total amount of time (1000 ms).
Afterward, a horizontal response scale appeared (0.4° high and 9.0°
wide) with a slider (0.4° high and 0.1° wide) in the center. The left-hand
side of the bar was labeled as “sure blue,” and the right-hand side was
labeled as “sure red” (depending on the counterbalancing of the response
mapping). The location of the slider on the scale was translated into a
numerical score, ranging from 50 (sure blue) to 50 (sure red), with
every three screen-pixel increments (0.09°) resulting in a difference of 1
confidence point. Participants moved the cursor with their mouse to
indicate jointly their response and their level of confidence, and con-
firmed by pressing the space bar. A response could not be given when the
cursor was exactly in the middle (0 on the scale), so participants were
always forced to make the categorical judgment between red or blue.
They were instructed to make this judgment at their own pace. Accuracy
for the final response was scored as a binary variable (i.e., ignoring con-
fidence level). Confidence was scored as the absolute value on the re-
sponse scale. To account for between-participant variation in use of the
confidence scale and drift in confidence judgments over the course of the
experiment, ratings were z-scored separately for each participant and
each block.
Participants gained 5 points for correct answers and lost 5 points for
errors. They could win up to an additional £4.92 by scoring points (650
points £1). Choosing to see the stimulus again in an easier version cost
1 point, giving participants an incentive to sample more information
only when the benefit of doing so (in terms of increasing the probability
of making a correct choice) outweighed this cost. Participants were ex-
plicitly instructed that they could scoremore points by strategic use of the
see again option.
Themain part of the experiment comprised 10 blocks of 64 trials, with
balanced numbers of trials for each combination of mean and variance
separately for each trial type (free-choice vs no-choice), in pseudo-
randomized order. Each block started with 8 additional practice trials in
which the free- versus no-choice phase was omitted and participants
received auditory feedback on the accuracy of their responses. This was
done to maintain a stable color criterion over the course of the experi-
ment. Before the main part of the experiment, several practice blocks
were administered. In the first block (64 trials), participants practiced the
color judgment task, and only were to give a speeded response with the
mouse, with auditory feedback to signal decision accuracy. In Blocks 2
and 3 (64 trials each), the second response (including the confidence
judgment) was added to the task. No feedbackwas delivered during these
blocks, which served to familiarize participants with the confidence rat-
ing scale. Finally, practice Block 4 was identical to the main part of the
experiment.
At the end of each block (starting from Block 2), the C value in the
low-mean condition was adjusted depending on performance in that
block. Specifically, an inverse efficiency score (median RT/p(correct))
was calculated for the condition with lowmean and low variance and the
condition with high mean and high variance (across all trials). When the
difference between the twowas100/50/10 in absolute value, theC value
of the low-mean condition was adjusted by 0.0025/0.0012/0.0005, re-
spectively, depending on the sign of the difference tomatch performance
in these two conditions. This manipulation was performed with the in-
tention of creating two conditions with equated performance but differ-
ent levels of confidence (Boldt et al., 2017a; Desender et al., 2018).
However, because in the current data there were small but consistent
performance differences between conditions and no significant differ-
ence in confidence (see Results), our key analyses were performed re-
gardless of condition. Importantly, however, additional analyses were
performed to rule out that our findings are driven by task difficulty.
EEG recording and preprocessing
Participants sat in a dimly lit, electrically shielded room. EEG data were
recorded using a fabric cap (QuickCap, Neuroscan) with 32 channels, all
referenced to the right mastoid online. Vertical and horizontal electro-
oculogramwasmeasured fromabove and below the left eye and the outer
canthi of both eyes. Impedance was kept at 50 k. The data were
continuously recorded using SynAmps2 amplifiers (Neuroscan), sam-
pled at 1000 Hz. Stimulus-locked data were baselined100 ms to 0 ms
before stimulus onset. In addition, these data were aligned to the time of
the primary response while keeping the same prestimulus baseline. Inde-
pendently from this, the raw data were also locked to the primary re-
sponse with a baseline100 to 0 ms before response onset. For analyses
locked to the information-seeking decision, the response-locked data
(keeping the same preresponse baseline) were realigned to the onset of
the information-seeking decision (i.e., the space bar press confirming the
decision). In preprocessing, segments containing gross artifacts were first
identified by visual inspection and removed. Next, eye blinks were re-
moved using independent component analysis, and segments containing
values 200 V were excluded using extreme value rejection. Bad
(noisy) channels were replaced by an interpolatedweighted average from
surrounding electrodes using the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme and
Makeig, 2004) in MATLAB (The MathWorks). Finally, segments con-
taining further artifacts, identified by visual inspection, were removed
before averaging. For plotting purposes only, datawere filtered using a 10
Hz low pass filter.
Statistical analyses
Behavioral analysis. To test whether our different measures of perfor-
mance lawfully scaled with difficulty, indices of performance were calcu-
lated separately for the factors mean and variance. This was done for
median response times (RTs) on correct trials and mean accuracy of the
primary response (calculated based on all trials), mean accuracy of the
secondary response, mean confidence on the secondary response (calcu-
lated on no-choice data), and the proportion of see again choices (calcu-
lated on free-choice data). A repeated-measures ANOVAwith the factors
mean (high or low) and variance (high or low) was then performed on all
these indices.
Next, we fitted a mixed-regression model to the data to test whether
confidence predicts information-seeking over and above other factors.
This analysis cannot be performed at the trial level because confidence
and see again choices are measured on separate parts of the data (no-
choice vs free-choice, respectively). Therefore, for all variables, we com-
puted eight data points (2 levels of mean  2 levels of variance  2
colors), separately for each participant. Specifically, we computed
(1) mean confidence based on the no-choice data, (2) the proportion of
see again choices based on the free-choice data, (3) mean accuracy of the
primary response based on all data, and (4) median RTs on the primary
response based on all data, separately for the factors evidence variance
(high or low), evidence mean (high or low), and color (red or blue).
Values were calculated separately for each color to partition the data in a
more fine-grained manner, but this variable was not taken into account
in the analyses. For ease of interpretation, low variability and high mean
were dummy coded as reference categories so that a positive effect of each
factor corresponds to an increase in difficulty.We usedmixed-regression
modeling (using the lme4 package in R) (Bates et al., 2015) to construct
models of increasing complexity. For each model, random slopes were
added for all variables for which this significantly increased the fit com-
pared with that model without random slopes. When required, degrees
of freedom were estimated using Satterthwaite’s approximation (using
the lmerTest package) (Kuznetsova et al., 2014).
Event-related potentials (ERPs). In a first set of analyses, we wanted to
confirm that our data showed the usual modulation of predecisional and
postdecisional event-related components as a function of decision con-
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fidence. Building on previous work, ERP indices of confidence and see
again choices were tested at electrode CPz (Boldt and Yeung, 2015).
Significant time windows during which ERPs for high and low confi-
dence trials (or for respond and see again trials) differed from each other
were identified using a standard two-tailed within-subjects cluster-based
permutation test using custom code in MATLAB. Elements that were
adjacent and significant (element-level p  0.05) were collected in a
cluster. Cluster-level test statistics consisted of the absolute sum of t
values within each cluster, and these were compared with a null distribu-
tion of test statistics created by drawing 1000 random permutations of
the observed data. A cluster was considered significant when its (cluster-
level) p value was  0.05. To examine whether the modulation of the
ERPs by confidence extended over and above our manipulation of task
difficulty, multivariate regression analyses were performed on each time
point (separately for each participant) predicting single-trial EEG ampli-
tude at electrodeCPz by the factorsmean (high or low), variance (high or
low), the interaction between mean and variance, and confidence (high
or low). We then performed cluster-based permutation tests on the t
values associated with each factor to examine whether confidence ex-
plains unique variance in EEG data after task difficulty is accounted for.
Time-resolved decoding. To test for overlap in the neural coding of
confidence and see again choices, a classifier was trained separately for
each participant using single-trial logistic regression based on the linear
derivationmethod introduced by Parra et al. (2005). This approach iden-
tifies the spatial distribution of scalp EEG activity in a given timewindow
that maximally distinguishes two classes to deliver a scalar estimate of
component amplitude. Three sets of analyses were performed. First, it
was tested how well information-seeking choices and how well decision
confidence can be decoded from EEG data (within-condition decoding).
These analyses were a first step in identifying the time window during
which information-seeking choices and decision confidence are decod-
able. Confidence judgments on no-choice trials were median split into
high and low values. In both analyses, both the training and testing sets
were restricted to trials with correct responses on the primary decision
only, to dissociate the coding of information-seeking and confidence
from the coding for errors. A 10-fold cross-validation approach was used
to avoid overfitting. To reduce noise due to the random assignment of
single trials in each fold, we repeated this procedure 100 times, resulting
in 1000 classifier predictions per time point. These scores were then
averaged, and below we report these averaged classification values. For
the third set of analyses, we tested how well see again choices can be
decoded from a classifier trained to discriminate EEG activity associated
with differing levels of confidence. The decoder was trained to discrimi-
nate high versus low confidence judgments (on correct trials only, from
no-choice trials) and tested on see again versus respond choices on cor-
rect trials from free-choice data; thus, there was no overlap between
training and testing data. This approach was repeated 1000 times. Vari-
ability across iterations arose due to the random selection of data neces-
sary to obtain an equal number of high and low confidence trials in the
training data and an equal number of see again and respond trials in the
free-choice data.
To increase the signal-to-noise ratio of data used for decoding, classi-
fiers were trained on time-averaged signals within discrete temporal win-
dows (windowwidth of 106ms,moving in 10ms increments along entire
epochs aligned to stimulus onset, initial decisions, and see again choices).
The ability to successfully classify individual trials was quantified by cal-
culating the Az score, which gives the area under the receiver operating
characteristic curve, derived from signal detection theory (Stanislaw and
Todorov, 1999). Classifiers were trained and tested on each time point of
the EEG data. Thus, this method produces a 2D (training time testing
time) decoding performance matrix. Specific dynamics of mental repre-
sentations can be unraveled by evaluating the shape of the decoding
matrix (King andDehaene, 2014). The statistical reliability of this decod-
ing was determined via a bootstrap procedure, comparing actual classi-
fication with classifier performance on trials with randomized condition
labels (1000 iterations with different randomizations), to provide an es-
timate of the null classification. Clusters were formed via paired-samples
t tests for the entire 2D matrix, comparing true and null classifications.
Neighboring elements that passed a threshold value corresponding to an
(element-level) p value of 0.01 (two-tailed) were collected into a separate
cluster. The same results were obtainedwhen using amore liberal thresh-
old of 0.05. Elements were considered as neighbors when they were (car-
dinally or diagonally) adjacent. Cluster-level test statistics consisted of
the absolute sumof t values within each cluster, and thesewere compared
with a null distribution of test statistics created by drawing 1000 random
permutations of the observed data. A cluster was considered significant
when its (cluster-level) p value was0.05.
Results
Behavioral results
Performance, confidence, and information-seeking
We first confirmed that all behavioral measures (performance,
confidence, and information-seeking) scaled with task difficulty
(Fig. 2). For the primary perceptual decision (speeded color dis-
crimination) data, a repeated-measures ANOVA showed that
both median RTs on correct trials and mean accuracy were sig-
nificantly affected by colormean (RTs: F(1,14) 14.96, p 0.002;
accuracy: F(1,14) 72.94, p 0.001) and by color variance (RTs:
F(1,14) 27.89, p 0.001; accuracy: F(1,14) 38.37, p 0.001),
but not by their interaction (RTs: F 1; accuracy: F 1). Mean
accuracy of the final response (regardless of the level of confi-
dence), calculated on the data of the no-choice condition in
which participants were forced to respond without viewing the
stimulus again, was likewise affected by both color mean
(F(1,14)  45.55, p  0.001) and color variance (F(1,14)  23.56,
p  0.001), but the interaction failed to reach significance
(F(1,14) 4.32, p 0.056). Mean confidence, again calculated on
the data of the no-choice condition (to avoid effects of seeing the
stimulus again), was affected by color mean (F(1,14) 32.18, p
0.001) and color variance (F(1,14) 21.73, p 0.001), but not by
their interaction (F  1). Finally, on free-choice trials, partici-
pants on average chose to see the stimulus again in an easier
version on 43.2% (range 2%–94%) of the trials. The proportion
of see again choices was affected by mean (F(1,14)  21.75, p 
0.001) and variance (F(1,14) 20.02, p 0.001), with no signifi-
cant interaction between these factors (F(1,14) 3.22, p 0.09).
The large variation in see again choices did not correlate with
individual differences in overall mean confidence on forced
choice trials (r(13)  0.22, p  0.428, Bayes Factor  0.26) or
accuracy on the primary response (r(13)  0.36, p  0.18, BF 
0.47). Replicating previous work (Desender et al., 2018), partici-
pants chose more often to see the stimulus again in the high
mean/high variance compared with the low mean/low variance
condition
(t(14)  2.47, p  0.027), even though, if anything, they made
numerically fewer errors in the former condition (p 0.189). A
one-way ANOVA on see again proportions across the two
medium-difficulty conditions, including the accuracy difference
as a covariate, confirmed the main effect of condition (F(1,13) 
8.92, p  0.011), which was not modulated by differences in
accuracy (F(1,13) 2.75, p 0.139). RTs were slower in the high
mean/high variance compared with the low mean/low variance
condition (t(14)  2.819, p  0.014), and unexpectedly, there
was no difference in confidence between these conditions (p 
0.570). Because the two conditions of medium difficulty did not
differ in terms of confidence,we analyzed the EEGdata combined
across conditions and then performed additional analyses to
demonstrate that the observed effects are not explained by task
difficulty.
The relation between decision confidence and information-seeking
To further interrogate potential sources of variability in observed
information-seeking behavior, mixed-regression models of in-
creasing complexitywere fit to the data predicting variation in the
proportion of see again choices across conditions of the experi-
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mental design (seeMaterials andMethods) by five predictors: the
factors color variance (high or low) and colormean (high or low),
and the variables median primary RTs (both on free-choice and
no-choice), mean accuracy of the primary response (both on
free-choice and no-choice), and mean confidence (on no-choice
trials). A model building strategy was used (Table 1). The exper-
imental variables mean and variance explained a significant part
of the variance in information-seeking (Model 1), and measures
of primary task performance (accuracy and RT) significantly in-
creased the fit (Model 2). Crucially, adding confidence to amodel
that already contained these four variables provided the best fit to
the data. As predicted, in this final model (Model 3), there was a
clear negative effect of confidence on see again choices ( 
0.08, t(85.63)  3.09, p  0.003), whereas the effects of RT
( 0.15, p 0.065) and variance ( 0.03, p 0.069) were no
longer statistically significant. The effects of accuracy and mean
were not significant either (both p values	 0.10). Thus, although
mean, variance, RTs, and accuracy explained a significant
amount of variation in information-seeking in simpler models,
their statistical contributions were largely accounted for by
confidence.
EEG analysis
ERP markers of confidence
To examine how ERP waveforms are modulated by confidence,
correct trials in the no-choice condition were split into high and
low confidence bins via median-split separately for each partici-
pant. As can be seen in Figure 3A, at electrode CPz, the stimulus-
locked ERP showed significant modulation by confidence from
414 to 581 ms (p  0.016, cluster level), corresponding to a
typical P300 component (Hillyard et al., 1971; Polich, 2007).
Mean amplitude was more positive for trials on which participants
later indicatedhigh(vs low)confidence.Bycontrast, theERPaligned
to and following the primary response showed the opposite pattern:
more negative amplitudes for high confidence trials were observed
from 403ms after response until the end of the analyzed epoch (700
ms; p 0.008, cluster level), corresponding to a typical Pe compo-
nent (Ridderinkhof et al., 2009). The topographies associated with
these significant time windows showed that these effects had a sim-
ilar centroparietal scalp distribution.
Postdecisional ERPs are modulated by confidence over and above
task condition
We next examined whether the modulation of the ERPs by con-
fidence extended over and above our manipulation of task diffi-
culty. To do so, we used multivariate regression analyses to
examine whether confidence explains unique variance in EEG
data after task difficulty is accounted for. Figure 4 shows the
Figure 2. Behavioral performance ismodulated bymean and variance.A, Mean accuracy of the primary response (based on all data).B, Median reaction times of the primary response (based on
all data). C, Mean accuracy of the final response (based on no-choice data).D, Mean standardized confidence (based on no-choice data). E, The number of trials onwhich participantswaived the see
again option (based on free-choice data).
Table 1. Models of different complexity predicting information seeking
Model df BIC Test 2 p
0A. Variance 4 37 — — —
0B. Mean 4 23 — — —
1. Variance
Mean 5 43 1 vs 0A 10.86 0.001
1 vs 0B 25.11 0.001
2. Variance
Mean
 RT
 Accuracy 12 118 2 vs 1 108.2 0.001
3. Variance
Mean
 RT
 Accuracy

 Confidencea 13 122 3 vs 2 9.13 0.002
aWinning model.
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average t value for each predictor from the multivariate regres-
sion on each time point. As can be seen, after controlling for task
difficulty, there is no consistent effect of confidence in the
stimulus-locked data (no significant elements in the cluster-
forming step). None of the factors capturing task difficulty was
significant (p values 	0.079). In the response-locked data, we
observed amodulation of the EEGdata by confidence, evenwhen
controlling for task difficulty, occurring between 481 and 615ms
after response (p 0.042). Slightly earlier in time, there also was
a significantmain effect of variance between 225 and 517ms after
Figure 3. ERPs as a function of confidence (A) and information-seeking choices (B). Head plots represent the difference in scalp distribution during the significant time periods for low-high
confidence (A) and seeagain-respond (B). Grayhorizontal lines indicate clusters duringwhichboth conditions significantly differ. Shadings represent SEM.Highand lowconfidence is calculated from
no-choice data and information-seeking choices from free-choice trials.
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response (p  0.021). Finally, in the data locked to the
information-seeking choice, therewas no effect of confidence (no
significant elements in the cluster-forming step), but a significant
main effect of mean between196ms before and 13ms after the
information-seeking choice (p 0.007). In sum, in the stimulus-
locked P3 cluster, we foundno reliablemodulation by confidence
after controlling for task difficulty; whereas in the response-
locked Pe cluster, we did observe a modulation by confidence
beyond the effect of experimentally induced task difficulty.
ERP markers of information-seeking choices
Figure 3B shows the ERP waveforms at CPz, separately for see
again and respond directly choices, again averaged over correct
trials only. The results closely mirror the modulation of the ERPs
by confidence. The stimulus-locked ERPs showed more positive
amplitudes on respond compared with see again trials, from 357
until 534ms (p 0.028, cluster level). The response-locked ERPs
showedmore negative amplitudes on respond comparedwith see
again trials, from 250 ms until the end of the epoch (700 ms, p
0.001, cluster level). Finally, the latter difference remained signif-
icant up until 29 ms before the information-seeking decision
(p  0.008, cluster level). Similar to confidence, all significant
effects had a clear centroparietal scalp distribution, although the
stimulus-locked P3 component for information-seeking choices
has a slightly more anterior scalp distribution than that for
confidence.
In sum, analysis of the ERPs provides preliminary evidence for
a link between confidence and information-seeking, given that
both processes have very similar neuralmarkers. In the following,
we use multivariate single-trial decoding to provide a more rig-
orous appraisal of this link, testing the informational content of
these neural markers (i.e., whether information-seeking choices
can be decoded reliably) and whether neural markers of confi-
dence are predictive of information-seeking behavior.
Time-resolved decoding
Within-condition decoding of information-seeking choices and
decision confidence
We first tested whether information-seeking choices can be de-
coded over time from the EEG data. This analysis is a first step in
identifying the time window during which information-seeking
can be decoded. In this analysis, classifiers were both trained and
tested on data from free-choice trials, using 10-fold cross-
validation as described above. Classifiers were trained and tested
on each point in time, thus shedding light on the generalization of
the discriminate pattern over time. In the stimulus-lockedmatrix
(Fig. 5A), no robust decoding was possible in the prestimulus
period (all cluster p values	0.143). The decoderwas only trained
on data up until 400ms after stimulus (13th percentile of RTs) to
avoid contamination from postresponse data (from trials with
short RTs). To complement this, the same analysis was repeated
after the data were realigned to the time of the response (but
keeping the same prestimulus baseline). Again, no decoding was
visible before response (all p values 	0.156), but there was a
significant cluster that largely fell after response (p 0.040; Fig.
5B). Next, we decoded EEG data measured in the postresponse
period, using a conventional preresponse baseline. This analysis
revealed that, inmarked contrast to the preresponse epoch, it was
possible to classify see again choices reliably across the entire
epoch from the initial task response to the subsequent see again
choice: There was a highly significant cluster that began just be-
fore primary response execution (Fig. 5C; p 0.001, cluster level)
and peaked just before the decision of whether or not to sample
more information (Fig. 5D; p  0.001, cluster level). Decoding
performance was strongest along the diagonal, indicating best
decoding when the cross-validation test data came from the same
timeperiod as the classifier training data.Nevertheless, both clusters
also displayed significant off-diagonal decoding, indicating that the
cross-validation testdata couldbepredictedabovechance level, even
when classifier training data were obtained from a different time
window. This strong temporal generalization suggests a neural ac-
tivity pattern that is consistent and sustained over time during the
formation of information-seeking choices.
Next, we used the same approach to examine whether deci-
sion confidence could be decoded from EEG data. This analysis
used no-choice trials only, to avoid any contaminating effects of
the see again choice itself. In the stimulus-lockedmatrix (Fig. 5E),
no robust decoding was observed (all cluster p values 	0.785).
Complementing this, when these preresponse data were re-
Figure 4. Time-resolved multivariate regression of EEG data by confidence and task difficulty. Horizontal lines indicate clusters significantly differing from 0. Shadings represent SEM.
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aligned to the response (keeping the same prestimulus baseline),
no significant clusters were observed (all cluster p values	0.195;
Fig. 5F). In contrast, in the postresponse period, there was a
highly significant cluster (p  0.002) during which decoding of
confidence was possible (Fig. 5G). Although this cluster was lim-
ited to 400 ms after response, it extended up to 550 ms after
response when using a more liberal cluster threshold of 0.05.
Finally, in the data locked to the information-seeking decision
(Fig. 5H), there were no significant clusters (p values	0.410).
Collectively, the preceding analyses suggest more robust de-
coding of confidence and see again choices based onpostresponse
EEG than preresponse EEG data. A final set of analyses aimed to
test these postresponse vs preresponse differences more directly.
To this end, we first identified clusters in the preresponse matri-
ces that came closest to significance in the permutation analyses
(comprising neighboring pixels with a significant effect, uncor-
rected), as representing the strongest observed decoding in the
preresponse period.We then selected a corresponding number of
pixels in the postresponse cluster, centered on its peak, and com-
pared decoding accuracies between clusters. When decoding see
again choices, decoding accuracy in the postresponse cluster (Fig.
5C) was significantly higher than the closest-to-significant cluster
in the stimulus-lockedmatrix (Fig. 5A; 5 pixels, t(14) 15.14, p
0.001) and the preresponse matrix with a prestimulus baseline
(Fig. 5B; 34 pixels, t(14)  26.83, p  0.001). The same was true
when decoding confidence (higher decoding than in the closest-
to-significance stimulus-locked cluster in Fig. 5E; 3 pixels, t(14)
3.69, p  0.002; and the closest-to-significance cluster in the
preresponse data with a prestimulus baseline in Fig. 5F; 23 pixels,
t(14)  5.52, p  0.001). To confirm that these results were not
specific to the particular cluster sizes used, we confirmed that
corresponding results were observed when taking clusters of 3
3, 5  5, 7  7, and 9  9 pixels around the peak pixel in each
matrix.
In sum, both information-seeking choices and decision con-
fidence could be decoded from EEG data, but only during the
time window following the primary task response. No above-
chance decoding was visible when classifiers were trained on EEG
data from the preresponse window.
Across-condition decoding of information-seeking choices
by confidence
While the previous analyses already hinted at the importance of
postdecisional neural activity for information-seeking choices,
those analyses are uninformative about the role of confidence in
this process. Our final set of analyses provided a more direct
test of the hypothesis that confidence underpins adaptive
information-seeking. Specifically, we testedwhether an EEG clas-
sifier trained to decode confidence on no-choice trials (i.e., in
which participants were not asked to decide whether or not to
seek further information before their final decision) would be
able to predict see again choices on free-choice trials (i.e., on the
Figure 5. Within-condition decoding of information-seeking choices (A–D) and confidence (E–H ). Classifierswere trained and tested on all time points (on correct trials only; steps of 10ms and
a slidingwindow of 106ms). Topographies represent the scalp projections obtained from the logistic regression classifier at the training timewhere classification is maximal. A,B, E, F, Prestimulus
baseline (100msuntil 0ms).C,D,G,H, Preresponsebaseline (100msuntil 0ms). Because of this difference in baseline, the regions of significant decoding inB,C andF,G are not identical. Solid
black lines indicate significant clusters ( p 0.05). The training times of each panel correspond to the testing time of that panel; for example, t 0 corresponds to stimulus, response, response, and
information-seeking decisions in panels A–D and E–H, respectively.
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separate set of trials in which participants had the option of seek-
ing or declining additional information). Importantly, on no-
choice trials participants did not make an information sampling
choice themselves but were forced to select the option to give
their response. This rules out the possibility that our classifier is
decoding incidental processes related to this choice, such as
motor-related neural activity resulting from the information-
seeking choice.Moreover, to ensure that our classifier was decod-
ing decision confidence, and not achieving above-chance
classification by exploiting other correlated features of the data
(e.g., trials in which participants changed their mind), only trials
on which participants were correct in both their initial and their
final decision were used to train the classifier.
In the resulting stimulus-locked matrix, there was no sign of
above-chance decoding (all p values	0.289; Fig. 6A). A comple-
mentary analysis in which these data were realigned to the time of
the response (keeping the same prestimulus baseline) also
showed no reliable preresponse decoding (all p values 	0.218;
Fig. 6B). The response-locked data, by contrast, showed signifi-
cant decoding from 350 to 700 ms after the response (p 
0.008, cluster level; Fig. 6C). Thus, a decoder trained to predict
confidence from EEG data from no-choice trials was able to pre-
dict information-seeking decisions from EEG data recorded on
free-choice trials, specifically in this postresponse window. As
becomes clear from the associated topography in Figure 6C, the
scalp projections show a very similar scalp distribution to the Pe
that was observed in the ERPs. Importantly, across-condition
decoding was not driven by a joint relation of confidence and
information-seeking to task difficulty (e.g., stimulus variance):
the same postresponse cluster was found (p  0.022) when the
factors mean (high or low), variance (high or low), and their
interactionwere first regressed out from the EEGdata (fromboth
the training and test datasets) on each time point at each elec-
trode, separately for each participant. Similar results were ob-
served in a further control analysis where these factors were
regressed out from participants’ confidence ratings before run-
ning the EEG decoding analysis. Conversely, after confidence
(high or low) was regressed out from the EEG data, a classifier
trained todecode taskdifficulty itself (specifically,whethera trialhad
an easy high mean/low variance stimulus vs a difficult low mean/
highvariance stimulus)didnot robustlygeneralizeacross conditions
to predict information-seeking choices (p values	0.101), nor was
there reliable decoding of task difficulty itself (p values 	0.405;
within-condition decoding). Together, these findings provide fur-
ther evidence that confidence predicts information-seeking behav-
ior, even when controlling for possible confounding effects of
objective task difficulty. Significant decoding was not observed in
analysis of data time-locked to the information sampling decision
(Fig. 6D; all cluster p values	0.256).
Our final set of analyses directly compared decoding accuracy
in postresponse versus preresponse periods. These analyses re-
vealed that decoding accuracy in the postresponse cluster (Fig.
6C) was significantly higher than the closest-to-significance clus-
ter in the stimulus-locked matrix (Fig. 6A; 1 pixel, t(14)  3.29,
p  0.005), and numerically higher compared with a cluster in
the preresponse data with a prestimulus baseline (Fig. 6B; 36
pixels, t(14)  1.56, p  0.140). To check that these results were
not specific to the particular cluster sizes used, we confirmed that
corresponding results were observed when taking clusters of 3
3, 5  5, 7  7, and 9  9 pixels around the peak pixel in each
matrix.
Discussion
The current study examined whether neural markers of decision
confidence are predictive of information-seeking behavior. To
this end, we recorded scalp EEG while participants performed a
task in which they first made an initial decision about a stimulus,
then chose whether or not to sample more information, before
providing their final response and level of confidence.
Information-seeking choices and confidence similarly modu-
lated predecisional (P3) and postdecisional (Pe) ERP compo-
nents. Using multivariate classification, we then showed that
information-seeking choices could be decoded from EEG data
from the time of the initial decision to the time of the subsequent
information-seeking choice (within-condition decoding). How-
ever, no above-chance decoding was visible preceding the initial
decision. Crucially, a classifier trained to decode high versus low
confidence generalized to prediction of information-seeking
choices (across-condition decoding), and this too was restricted
to a post-RTwindow. The time period during which we observed
robust across-condition generalization (i.e., from no-choice trial
confidence ratings to free-choice trial information-seeking be-
havior) corresponds to that of a postdecisional neural marker of
decision confidence, suggesting that the latter reflects a neural
Figure 6. Across-condition decoding of information-seeking choices by confidence, locked to the stimulus (A), the response (B, C) and the information-seeking choice (D). Classifiers are trained
on high versus low confidence from no-choice data and tested on see again versus respond decisions from free-choice data (both on correct trials only). Above-chance decoding only occurs
postresponse. The same conventions as in Figure 5A–D apply.
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process integral to translating one’s subjective sense of confi-
dence into overt decisions to sample more information.
When confronted with difficult decisions, humans seek further
information to improve the quality of their decisions. Unsolicited
information does not affect decisions, whereas decisions are more
accuratewhenadditional information isactively solicited(Hungand
Yoong, 2010). This suggests that the act of seeking further informa-
tion isdrivenbyan internal evaluation.Astraightforwardhypothesis
is that humans internally compute the probability of making a cor-
rect decision; and when this probability is low, they seek additional
information. Indeed, in a recent behavioral study, we were able to
demonstrate that explicitly representeddecision confidence predicts
information-seeking, even across conditions matched for objective
difficulty (Desender et al., 2018). In contrast to that finding and
other previous work (Spence et al., 2016; Boldt et al., 2017a), in the
current studywe did not observe a difference in confidence between
the two medium difficulty conditions (high mean/high variance vs
lowmean/low variance) of the same task. This discrepancymight in
part reflect the failure of our psychophysical staircase to match be-
havioral performance across these conditions. Participants made
perceptualdecisions significantlymoreslowlyandnumericallymore
accurately with high variance stimuli, suggesting a more cautious
response strategy that would tend to inflate confidence (Vickers and
Packer, 1982). Moreover, in the current study, confidence was only
calculated from no-choice data, which constituted 25% of all data,
thus making our design less sensitive to find subtle differences be-
tween two specific conditions. Despite this, using mixed modeling,
we were able to demonstrate that decision confidence, not objective
accuracy or stimulus difficulty, was the main variable predicting
information-seeking.
The current work significantly extends our previous behavioral
findings by characterizing the neural signatures integral to translat-
ing decision confidence into overt information-seeking choices. In
particular, we could predict information-seeking behavior based on
confidence; however, we could do so only in postdecisional EEG
activity, even thoughaveragedERPwaveformsvaried significantly as
a function of confidence and see again choices also in the predeci-
sional period. As such, our findings converge with theoretical work
arguing that postdecisional evidence accumulation plays a critical
role in confidence judgments (Pleskac andBusemeyer, 2010;Moran
et al., 2015; Fleming and Daw, 2017) and subsequent actions. De-
pending on the strength of the postdecisional evidence (i.e., reflect-
ing the degree of confidence), participants will seek additional
information or not.
The postdecisional neural marker observed in the current
work closely resembles the classical Pe component of the ERP
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2009). This neural marker has been sug-
gested to reflect an evidence accumulation signal evaluating the
likelihood that the just-executed response was incorrect (Stein-
hauser and Yeung, 2010; Murphy et al., 2015). Accordingly, the
amplitude of this signal (reflecting the amount of evidence for an
error) has been shown to scale inversely with decision confidence
(Boldt and Yeung, 2015). Our observation of this signal after
participants made a primary decision in both the no-choice and
free-choice conditions suggests that, in both conditions, evidence
is accumulated about the likelihoodof this decision being correct.
This evaluation process could, in principle, be used to guide both
immediate, binary information-seeking choices (by imposing a sin-
gle threshold on the evolving tally of error evidence) (Murphy et al.,
2015) and later confidence reports (by translating the final continu-
ous evidence tally into a correspondingly graded expression of
confidence). The present finding of significant across-condition de-
coding provides important support for this idea by showing that
both confidence reports and information-seeking choices appear to
be reflected in the same underlying neural signal.
An alternative interpretation of our results could be that the
postdecisional neural marker we describe reflects the internal
decision to seek more information, rather than a common signal
that can be leveraged for making both information-seeking deci-
sions and graded confidence reports. In other words, perhaps
participants made internal information-seeking decisions on no-
choice trials despite there being no explicit requirement to do so,
and the neural signal that is central to our analyses reflects this.
Such an explanation of our findings seems unlikely for two rea-
sons. First, our postdecisional neural signal highly resembles the
well-characterized Pe component, both in time and scalp distri-
bution (Ridderinkhof et al., 2009). The Pe is reliably observed in
paradigms that do not require any overt postdecisional response,
which makes it unlikely that it reflects a signal specifically related
to this additional response. Second, if this postdecisional neural sig-
nal directly reflects the information sampling choice, it should be
related to systematic biases that are observed in such choices. We
indeed observed large interindividual differences in the tendency to
prefer one of the information-seeking options, with some partici-
pants biased toward respond choices (N 10, on average 23% see
again choices, RTsee again 1245 ms vs RTrespond 800 ms, t(9)
4.18, p  0.002) and others toward see again choices (N  5, on
average 73% see again choices, RTsee again 797 ms vs RTrespond
953 ms, t(4)2.02, p 0.11). For both subgroups, however, the
postdecisional neural marker was of higher amplitude when partic-
ipants chose to see more information (replicating Fig. 3B; both p
values0.001). This observation is hard to reconcile with the idea
that postdecisional neural activity reflects processes related specifi-
cally to the information-sampling choice, but are compatible with
our interpretation that this activity indexes an evaluation of the ac-
curacy of the just-executed response, which then informs explicit
confidence reports and information-seeking choices.
Neither within-condition nor across-condition decoding
analyses yielded above-chance decoding of confidence or
information-seeking choices in the time window occurring be-
fore the response. This lack of decoding is striking given that
predecisional neural activity (corresponding to the well-studied
P3 component) was found to be sensitive to confidence and
information-seeking in univariate analyses. In this regard, it is
important to note that not all neural signals that are modulated
by confidence are also involved in the representation of explicit
(i.e., subjective) confidence (Pouget et al., 2016). Several studies
showed predecisional neural markers that are sensitive to the
level of confidence (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009;Gherman andPhili-
astides, 2015, 2018; Odegaard et al., 2018). For example,
Odegaard et al. (2018) demonstrated that opt-out decisions (pre-
sumably reflecting low confidence) are associated with weak
traces of neural evidence inmonkey superior colliculus occurring
before the response. However, using a positive-evidence manip-
ulation that dissociates evidence quality from confidence, they
were able to show that the predecisional neural activity tracks
evidence quality, not subjective confidence (both of which are
typically closely associated). A similar observation was made in
the current work. Significant modulation of the predecisional
neural marker by confidence disappeared once stimulus variabil-
ity (i.e., a measure of evidence quality) was taken into account.
Together, this might explain why predecisional neural markers
are modulated by confidence but do not predict information-
seeking choices.
Our findings are of relevance to research on the role of uncer-
tainty in action control (Daw et al., 2005; Yu and Dayan, 2005).
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From a Bayesian perspective, uncertainty (i.e., the inverse of con-
fidence) can be used as a cue for behavioral control (Daw et al.,
2005). From this, it follows that decision confidence should pre-
dict strategic decisions, such as whether or not to sample more
evidence (Meyniel et al., 2015). Our findings are the first empir-
ical demonstration that decision confidence and the adaptive act
of information-seeking share the same neural signal. Another
relevant connection to our work is research on exploitation–
exploration dilemmas.When forced to decide fromwhich of several
patches to harvest, participants are faced with the dilemma between
exploiting a known patch or exploring unknown but potentially
more rewarding patches. Empirical andmodelingwork has demon-
strated that participants’ uncertainty about these choices arbitrates
between the two strategies. Consistent with normative theories
(Sutton and Barto, 2018), participants actively explore unknown
patches to gain information and reduce their uncertainty (Badre
et al., 2012; Cavanagh et al., 2012). Interestingly, recent research
has indicated an important role for subjective confidence in this
process (Boldt et al., 2017b). Specifically, when confidence in
value representations was low, participants actively explored un-
known patches. Although the underlying construction of confi-
dence may differ (confidence in value representation vs
confidence in the accuracy of a decision), in both cases, low con-
fidence triggers the need for information-seeking.
In conclusion, it was shown that a classifier trained to decode
confidence based on EEG data was able to predict information-
seeking decisions, specifically in the time window following a
speeded decision about the stimulus. This suggests that postdeci-
sional neural processes are integral to translating decision confi-
dence into overt decisions to seek further information.
Notes
All raw data can be freely accessed at https://osf.io/z7umt/.
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